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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Jessica L. Wenzel was sentenced to a unified term of two years, with one year
fixed, for felony possession of a controlled substance. She appeals from the district
court’s order denying her motion to suppress. The district court denied Ms. Wenzel’s
motion to suppress because it concluded her purse was within the scope of a search
warrant for the residence in which was an overnight guest. The district court erred in
concluding Ms. Wenzel’s status as an overnight guest meant she did not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in her purse, which was located directly next to where
she was found sleeping, and which the officers knew or should have known belonged to
her, and not to one of the individuals named in the search warrant.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
A magistrate judge issued a search warrant for a residence in Bonners Ferry,
Idaho, which was, according to the search warrant, “currently occupied by RC Clemons,
Chelsea Endicott, and Cantrip Gatens.” (Ex., p.2.) The search warrant was based on
probable cause to believe that evidence of the criminal offense of delivery of a
controlled substance was located at the residence. (Ex., p.1.) The search warrant
authorized a search of the residence, outbuildings, and two specific vehicles located at
the residence. (Ex., p.2.)
While executing the search warrant at approximately 1:30 pm, officers Willie
Cowell and Caleb Watts discovered Ms. Wenzel “lying on [an] ottoman” in the basement
utility room, sleeping under a pile of clothes. (Conf. Exs., p.24; 9/8/16 Tr., p.33, Ls.1317.) Officer Watts recognized Ms. Wenzel from previous law enforcement encounters,
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and thus knew she was not one of the individuals named in the search warrant. (9/8/16
Tr., p.44, Ls.13-25.) Ms. Wenzel testified at the suppression hearing that she had slept
at the residence the night before, first on a sofa upstairs, and then on the ottoman in the
utility room. (9/8/16 Tr., p.6, Ls.12-14, p.14, Ls.11-16.) The officers woke Ms. Wenzel
up, led her upstairs and outside, and detained her there while they searched the
residence. (9/8/16 Tr., p.36, Ls.3-6.)
Officer Cowell searched Ms. Wenzel’s purse, which he found in the utility room
on the ottoman where Ms. Wenzel had been sleeping.

(9/8/16 Tr., p.31, L.23 – p.32,

L.1; R., p.123.) Ms. Wenzel testified at the suppression hearing that her purse “was
right next to [her] by the ottoman” and was within arms’ reach. (9/8/16 Tr., p.11, Ls.3-7.)
Officer Cowell found Ms. Wenzel’s wallet inside her purse. (9/8/16 Tr., p.31, Ls.16-22.)
He searched Ms. Wenzel’s wallet, and found her identification inside the wallet, and five
pills, later determined to be hydrocodone, in an outer zippered portion of the wallet.
(9/8/16 Tr., p.32, Ls.5-13, p.37, Ls.10-18; Conf. Exs., p.28.) Officer Cowell brought
Ms. Wenzel back inside and advised of her rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966). (9/8/16 Tr., p.38, Ls.1-16.) Ms. Wenzel said, “I already know what
you found,” and told the officer he found “a couple of hydros.” (9/8/16 Tr., p.28, Ls.2022, p.38, Ls.17-25.)
Ms. Wenzel was charged by Information with one count of felony possession of a
controlled substance. (R., pp.41-42.) She filed a motion to suppress, challenging the
search of her purse and wallet under the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and Article I, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution. (R., pp.75-76, 99-105.) The
district court held a hearing on Ms. Wenzel’s motion and admitted a copy of the search
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warrant into evidence. (R., pp.113-18; Exs., pp.1-3; 9/8/16 Tr., p.40, L.20 – p.41, L.2.)
Ms. Wenzel testified that she asked the officers if she could grab her purse before she
was led outside, and was told “no.” (9/8/16 Tr., p.11, Ls.8-11.) Officers Cowell and
Watts were both asked if Ms. Wenzel made any statement regarding her desire to have
her purse, and both testified they could not remember her making such a statement.
(9/8/16 Tr., p.36, Ls.10-13, p.46, Ls.10-12.)
The district court denied Ms. Wenzel’s motion to suppress. (R., pp.120-37.) As
an initial matter, the district court found credible the testimony of the two officers “that
they do not remember [Ms. Wenzel] making any . . . request [to grab her purse when
she was required to go outside].”

(R., p.128.)

The district court then concluded

Ms. Wenzel had standing to challenge the search of her purse and wallet because she
was an overnight guest at the residence named in the search warrant, but further
concluded the search of her purse and wallet did not exceed the scope of the search
warrant because of her status as an overnight guest. (R., pp.128-36.)
Ms. Wenzel then entered into an agreement with the State pursuant to which she
pled guilty to the charged offense, reserving her right to appeal from the district court’s
order denying her motion to suppress, and the State recommended a suspended
sentence. (9/22/16 Tr., p.3, Ls.4-15; R., pp.138-39, 140-48, 149-50.) The district court
accepted Ms. Wenzel’s guilty plea, sentenced her to a unified term of two years, with
one year fixed, and then suspended the sentence and placed her on probation for two
years. (9/22/16 Tr., p.6, Ls.17-19; (11/10/16 Tr., p.8, Ls.16-20.) The judgment was
entered on November 10, 2016, and Ms. Wenzel filed a timely notice of appeal on
November 23, 2016. (R., pp.154-58, 162-65.)
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ISSUE
Did the district court err in denying Ms. Wenzel’s motion to suppress?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred In Denying Ms. Wenzel’s Motion To Suppress

A.

Introduction
The question presented in this case is whether law enforcement officers may

search the personal property of a non-occupant visitor when executing a search warrant
for the premises in which the visitor is found. This question has not been addressed by
this Court or the United States Supreme Court, though the United States Supreme
Court held in Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979), that a search warrant for a bartender
and a public tavern authorizing a search for evidence of the offense of possession of a
controlled substance did not authorize law enforcement officers to search a customer
who happened to be present at the tavern at the time of the search. Id. at 90-91. The
Court thus recognized that every person possesses a Fourth Amendment protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures, and a person’s “mere propinquity to
others independently suspected of criminal activity does not, without more, give
probable cause to search that person.” Id. at 91.
In State v. Bulgin, 120 Idaho 878 (Ct. App. 1991), the Court of Appeals adopted
the relationship test as articulated in United States v. Young, 909 F.2d 442 (11th Cir.
1990), for answering the question presented in this case. Bulgin, 120 Idaho at 880.
Under the relationship test, in considering whether a visitor’s personal property is
subject to search pursuant to a search warrant for the premises in which the visitor is
found, “the court must consider the relationship [between] the object, the person and the
place being searched.” Id. The district court applied the relationship test here, and
concluded Ms. Wenzel’s purse was subject to search because she was an overnight
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guest at the residence named in the search warrant. (R., pp.133-36.) The district court
oversimplified the relationship test and erred in applying it to this case.
In Bulgin, the Court concluded the search of the defendant’s purse was within the
scope of a search warrant because “[n]ot only was she an overnight guest at the
premises described in the search warrant, the officers had described her in the affidavit
and articulated a suspicion that she was using methamphetamine.” 120 Idaho at 88081. The mere fact that the defendant was an overnight guest was not determinative in
Bulgin, and should not be determinative here. Ms. Wenzel was not described in the
affidavit in support of the search warrant, and the officers did not articulate a suspicion
that she was using controlled substances. Ms. Wenzel had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in her purse, even though it was not in her physical possession when the
officers executed the search warrant, and the officers knew or should have known the
purse belonged to Ms. Wenzel, who was not named in the search warrant. The district
court should have granted Ms. Wenzel’s motion to suppress because the search of her
purse and wallet was beyond the scope of the search warrant.

B.

Standard Of Review
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision

on a motion to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court’s findings of fact which
were supported by substantial evidence, but we freely review the application of
constitutional principles to the facts as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561
(Ct. App. 1996).
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C.

This Court Should Apply The Relationship Test Or The Notice Test To Determine
Whether Ms. Wenzel’s Purse Was Within The Scope Of The Search Warrant
In the absence of controlling authority from the United States Supreme Court,

state and federal courts have adopted different tests for analyzing the question
presented in this case, which is whether law enforcement officers may search the
personal property of a non-occupant visitor when executing a search warrant for the
premises in which the visitor is found.

Some courts have adopted the physical

possession test, which focuses on whether the visitor had the personal property in his or
her physical possession at the time of the search. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson,
475 F.2d 977, 979 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (holding search of defendant’s purse was within the
scope of a search warrant for the apartment she was visiting because she was not
wearing the purse at the time of the search, and it thus did not constitute an extension
of her person); State v. Reid, 77 P.3d 1134, 1140 (Or. App. 2003) (holding search of
defendant’s jacket was lawful because he was not wearing the jacket at the time it was
seized and searched from the apartment where he was an overnight guest).
Other courts have applied the relationship test, which was developed in response
to a concern that the physical possession test insulates guilty parties who could evade
detection by giving contraband to visitors, and fails to protect the privacy interests of
visitors who merely put down their personal property for purposes of convenience. See,
e.g., United States v. Micheli, 487 F.2d 429, 431 (1st Cir.1973) (criticizing the physical
possession test as too narrow because “it would leave vulnerable many personal
effects, such as wallets, purses, cases, or overcoats, which are often set down upon
chairs or counters, hung on racks, or checked for convenient storage”).

The

relationship test requires consideration of the connection between the visitor, the
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visitor’s personal property, and the reason for the search warrant. See, e.g., Young,
909 F.2d at 445 (adopting relationship test and finding it “perfectly consistent with the
Supreme Court’s decision in Ybarra v. Illinois”).
Still other courts have applied a variation of the relationship test called the notice
test, which prohibits officers from searching the personal property of a visitor when
executing a premises search warrant if the officers knew or should have known the
personal property belonged to the visitor. See, e.g., State v. Lohr, 263 P.3d 1287,
1291-92 (Wash. App. 2011) (holding warrant to search the premises did not cover
defendant’s purse that “was readily recognizable as her personal effect” and noting “if
an item is readily recognizable as belonging to an individual not named in the warrant,
the item is not within the warrant’s scope”); see also State v. Jackson, 260 P.3d 1240,
1243-47 (Kan. App. 2011) (holding search of defendant’s purse was beyond the scope
of a search warrant authorizing a search for illegal drugs and paraphernalia at a
particular residence because the officers knew or should have known the purse
belonged to the defendant and there was no suggestion that the defendant either lived
at the residence or was engaged in illegal activity); State v. Light, 306 P.3d 534, 541
(N.M. Ct. App. 2013) (holding search of defendant’s purse was unlawful where purse
was found on premises to be searched pursuant to a search warrant, separate from its
owner, but police knew the purse belonged to defendant and there was nothing to
connect the purse to the suspected illegal activity).
This Court should adopt either the relationship test or the notice test because
these tests better preserve the constitutional rights of individuals unconnected with
suspected criminal activity. See State v. Jackson, 873 P.2d 1166, 1169-71 (Utah Ct.
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App. 1994) (Orme, dissenting) (explaining his disagreement with the majority’s adoption
of the physical possession test). Either of these tests would allow visitors, under certain
circumstances, to retain a constitutionally-protected expectation of privacy in their
personal possessions if they temporarily set them down. The touchstone of the Fourth
Amendment is, of course, reasonableness under the particular circumstances
presented. See Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 855 n. 4 (2006); Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 19 (1968). This Court should adopt either the relationship test or the notice test
as both of these tests focus on the particular circumstances presented, and reject the
bright line rule of protecting only personal property that is in a visitor’s physical
possession.

D.

Applying Either The Relationship Test Or The Notice Test, This Court Should
Conclude Ms. Wenzel’s Purse Was Not Within The Scope Of The Search
Warrant Because Ms. Wenzel Was Not A Usual Occupant Of The Residence
And The Officers Knew Or Should Have Known The Purse Belonged To Her
If this Court applies the notice test, the resolution of this case is straightforward.

Ms. Wenzel’s purse was beyond the scope of the search warrant because officers knew
or should have known the purse located on the ottoman where she was sleeping
belonged to her, and they knew she was not named in the search warrant. See, e.g.,
Lohr, 263 P.3d at 1291-92; Jackson, 260 P.3d at 1243-47; Light, 306 P.3d at 541.
This Court should also conclude Ms. Wenzel’s purse was beyond the scope of
the search warrant under the relationship test because she was not a usual occupant of
the residence named in the search warrant. Under the relationship test, “the usual
occupant of a building being searched would lose a privacy interest in his belongings
located there; however, a transient visitor would retain his expectation of privacy,
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whether or not his belongings are being held by him or have temporarily been put
down.” Young, 909 F.2d at 444-45 (discussing United States v. Micheli, 487 F.2d 429
(1st Cir. 1973)). The critical question under the relationship test is whether Ms. Wenzel
was a “usual occupant” or a “transient visitor” of the residence named in the search
warrant. Courts have struggled with this distinction. See State v. Andrews, 549 N.W.2d
210, 217-18 (Wis. 1996) (“Jurists have had a particularly hard time distinguishing
visitors from occupants, which is a critical determination in the relationship test under
which the police cannot search the belongings of a ‘mere visitor.’”) Here, the district
court concluded Ms. Wenzel was a usual occupant of the residence named in the
search warrant because she was an overnight guest. (R., p.134.) The district court
erred in its conclusion because it oversimplified the test.
The fact that a person is an overnight guest does not compel the conclusion that
she is a usual occupant for purposes of the relationship test. The real question is
whether the person, whether an overnight or daytime guest, has a reasonable
expectation of privacy in her personal possessions in light of her relationship to the
premises. In Micheli, the First Circuit Court of Appeals concluded a visitor’s briefcase
fell within the scope of a search warrant for a commercial premises because he had a
special relationship to the premises, as a co-owner of the business. 487 F.2d at 43132. The Court explained:
Our basic rationale for deciding that [the defendant’s] briefcase fell within
the scope of the warrant to search the premises does not . . . rest upon
the fact that at the time of the search his briefcase was out of his physical
possession. Rather, we base our decision on the fact that, as co-owner of
the Hillside Press, [the defendant] was not in the position of a mere visitor
or passerby who suddenly found his belongings vulnerable to a search of
the premises. He had a special relation to the place, which meant that it
could reasonably be expected that some of his personal belongings would
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be there. Thus, the showing of probable cause and necessity which was
required prior to the initial intrusion into his office reasonably
comprehended within its scope those personal articles, such as his
briefcase, which might be lying about the office.
Id. at 432.

Under this analysis, a person’s status as an overnight guest is not

dispositive on the question of whether the person should be viewed as a usual occupant
or a transient visitor.
In Hayes v. State, 234 S.E.2d 360 (Ga. App. 1977), the Court of Appeals of
Georgia held that evidence discovered during a search of a suitcase belonging to an
individual who was sleeping on a couch in a private residence when police officers
entered to execute a search warrant at 9:30 am should have been suppressed because
the individual was a nonresident visitor not named in the search warrant. Id. at 361-62.
The court explained:
[W]e believe the officers had enough notice that they were searching the
personal effects of a person they had no authority to search so that the
search was an unreasonable intrusion into the appellant’s privacy. The
circumstances they encountered when they began the search for
example, one man asleep on the living room couch with a suitcase next to
him are inconsistent with the notice that the man was the resident “Mark.”
Id. at 362.
Similarly, in State v. Thomas, 818 S.W.2d 350 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991), the
Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee held a search of a visitor’s purse located on the
floor of a bedroom was beyond the scope of a search warrant even though the visitor
was an overnight guest. Id. at 357-60. The court held the search of the defendant’s
purse was unlawful because officers “knew or should have known” the purse belonged
to the visitor, and there was no opportunity for anyone to have hidden drugs in the purse
prior to the search. Id. at 360.
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This case is factually analogous to Thomas and, considering the totality of the
circumstances, the district court erred in concluding Ms. Wenzel’s purse was within the
scope of the search warrant under the relationship test. While Ms. Wenzel was an
overnight guest at the residence, she did not have a special relationship to the
residence such that she lost her reasonable expectation of privacy in her personal
possessions when she elected to sleep there. Though she was not wearing her purse
on her body when she fell asleep on the ottoman, it was close to her, within her arms’
reach, and could not reasonably have belonged to anyone else. Officer Watts testified
that he recognized Ms. Wenzel, and thus knew she was not one of the individuals
named in the search warrant, even without looking at her identification.
Tr., p.44, Ls.13-25.)

(9/8/16

Ms. Wenzel was asleep when officers arrived to execute the

warrant, and there is no indication that she or anyone else had any opportunity to hide
anything illegal in the purse in order to avoid its discovery.
Moreover, a woman’s purse is a special kind of container that its owner generally
intends to keep private. See Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 308 (1999) (Breyer,
concurring) (describing purses as “repositories of especially personal items that people
generally like to keep with them at all times” and stating he is “tempted to say that a
search of a purse involves an intrusion so similar to a search of one’s person that the
same rule should govern both”). Considering the connection between Ms. Wenzel, her
purse, and the reason for the search warrant, see Young, 909 F.2d at 445, this Court
should conclude Ms. Wenzel’s purse was beyond the scope of the warrant.

See

State v. Fairchild, 121 Idaho 960, 967 (Ct. App. 1992) (stating when a search exceeds
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the scope of a valid search warrant, the property unlawfully searched will be
suppressed).

E.

This Court Should Suppress The Statements Ms. Wenzel Made After Her Purse
And Wallet Were Searched Because Those Statements Were Fruit Of The
Poisonous Tree
The exclusionary rule prevents the use by the government of evidence obtained

in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and prevents
use of evidence obtained from exploitation of the original illegality as fruit of the
poisonous tree. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963); State v.
Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 810-11 (2009). “The test is whether, granting establishment of
the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at
by exploitation of the original illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to
be purged of the primary taint.” Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488 (quotation marks and
brackets omitted). The incriminating statements Ms. Wenzel made to Officer Cowell
regarding the contents of her purse came only as a result of the illegal search of her
purse. The officer would not have discovered the drugs in Ms. Wenzel’s wallet, and
would not have been in a position to question her about them, absent the illegal search.
This Court should suppress the incriminating statements Ms. Wenzel made along with
the physical evidence.
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CONCLUSION
Ms. Wenzel respectfully requests that this Court vacate her conviction, reverse
the district court’s order denying her motion to suppress, and remand this case to the
district court for further proceedings.
DATED this 25th day of April, 2017.

__________/s/_______________
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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